Afghanistan: An Enduring Problem
Ian Oliver

Afghanistan produces over 90% of the world’s heroin supply that yields 52% of the country’s GDP; it is severely dysfunctional and beset by problems relating to weaknesses in both Central and Provincial Government which are compounded by systemic corruption at all levels and in almost all aspects of society. The country is in urgent need of redevelopment from its very foundations after decades of internal conflict and unwelcome invasions have destroyed its infrastructure. Thirty seven countries are present, ostensibly to help rebuild the country, but there are many conflicting views of the way forward with no obvious sign that any has yet found the direction, let alone produced a “road map” to follow.

Development is necessarily slow and incremental, and there are no guarantees of success. The insurgency by the Taliban has intensified to such an extent that military experts are indicating that it is of a type that cannot be won in the same way as a conventional war.(1) Opium production has increased to record levels, confronting the Government of Afghanistan and its international partners with two major problems as far as counter-narcotics policing is concerned: firstly, there is a need to develop a professionally trained and competent police agency which will take many years and a great deal of investment to achieve; and secondly, there is the urgent need to respond, immediately and effectively, to the serious threat posed by the insurgency and the increasing amounts of opium that are produced and exported. Afghanistan has inadequate and insufficient counter-narcotics law enforcement capabilities to respond to the impact of the illicit drug trade,(2) and the international military presence has failed to overcome the resistance of the insurgents.

Recent years have seen record productions of the opium poppy crop. In 2006 Afghanistan produced 6100 tons of opium (equivalent to approximately 600 tons of heroin)(3). Figures produced at the end of August 2007 indicated a significant increase (34%) in opium production compared with the previous year, with 193,000 hectares under opium poppy cultivation (+17%) resulting in 8200 tons of opium(4). In 2008 estimated production was slightly less at 7,700 tons. Such amounts represent an enormous social problem, for the abuse of opium and the derivative is directly connected to three global issues:

1. Public Health. The spread of HIV/AIDS, hepatitis C and other blood- borne diseases, which have been classified by the World Health Organisation as global pandemics;
2. Organised crime. This includes for example, trafficking in humans, arms smuggling and money laundering. National police forces often indicate that between 50-70% of crimes committed worldwide are in some way drug related.
3. International terrorism. Most terrorist groups are thought to be in receipt of some of their funding from drug trafficking and associated crimes.(5)

In Afghanistan there are few income-generating activities available for a population with one of the lowest standards of living in the world and with a low life expectancy due to the privations of a harsh and barren country, an adverse climate and socio-political conditions that make basic survival for many extremely difficult.

The huge profits generated by drug trafficking have created power bases for warlords, wealthy landowners and insurgents, such that they continue to flaunt their ability to defy Government attempts to bring order and the rule of law across Afghanistan. For the general population, the reverse is high unemployment, widespread illiteracy, extreme poverty verging on starvation in some areas, fear of reprisal for failing to obey warlords and powerful drug traffickers and disenchantment with a weak Government that appears to be unable to improve conditions. Inevitably, this leads some people to side with the most powerful and to oppose the possibility of a unified State. Thus, it appears that besides coercion from the Taliban and others, money has been spent by insurgents and drug traffickers to align the interests of some farmers with their own, so that in many cases there is willing co-operation in increasing opium poppy cultivation. Where willingness is absent or resistance is experienced, extremely compelling methods are employed to ensure the continued growth of such a lucrative crop. It is difficult to resist when families are starving, the general population has no confidence in the Government’s ability (or willingness) to bring about change and the populace distrusts the police force which is known to be overwhelmingly corrupt.

The Afghanistan National Development Strategy draws attention to the fact that drugs subvert governance, and aid dependency leaves institutions weak; sadly, there are too many examples that support that statement.

Regrettably, Afghanistan has so far received much less economic aid per capita of population than other post-conflict areas(6). International assistance will be required for many more years, and at the present rate of progress, opium production will continue largely unfettered for decades. Military forces have been reluctant to become involved in the destruction of poppy crops as this would conflict with the strategy to win the hearts and minds of the local populace. There are conflicting views between international partners about how to address the problem. Only recently, NATO has reluctantly agreed to allow the 73,000 foreign troops in the country to target heroin laboratories and major traffickers. Currently, the strategy is for minimising opium production and attempting a gradual reduction in the availability of the poppy crop.

In 2006 only 6 of the 34 provinces were reported to be free of opium, and production was said to have fallen in 8 others, mainly in the North; the majority of the opium crop comes from Helmand Province in the South where the major insurgency occurs. In August 2007, 13 provinces were reported to be free of opium and plans were said to be in hand for other provinces to follow suit.(7) The number of provinces said to be opium free in October 2008 was reported to be eighteen.(8) However, production is easily restored, and insufficient attention has been given to the creation of viable alternative livelihoods. The infrastructure of the country is inadequate to encourage the rapid growth of alternative crops, and even if it were adequate, it takes time to develop global markets that could compete with the rewards available from the poppy crop. Those who comply with the targets of reduced opium production must see benefits from so doing; otherwise, both necessity and coercion will continue to influence their thinking. In a report prepared for the Offices of the Inspector General of the Departments of State and Defense of the United States, it was noted that the preliminary goals for eradication in 2007 were unrealistic(9). The assessment team had visited seven provinces and found “no realistic possibility of outspending economic incentives in the narcotics industry”.

Thus, it is important to give a great deal of attention to rebuilding the infrastructure of the country so that living conditions improve and hope for a better future becomes reality. It was noted in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy:  “when poor communities perceive themselves to have been politically marginalised or economically forgotten, they are far more likely to suffer the resentment and alienation that drug lords and terrorists exploit”. Unfortunately, worsening conditions and a loss of confidence not only in the Government of Afghanistan but also in its International partners to achieve anything like the necessary progress has resulted in that resentment amongst many Afghan nationals who ask the legitimate question: “Why cannot the greatest and richest powers in the world bring peace and stability to a war-torn country that is crying out for settlement?” Part of the problem is that donor coordination is said to be poor and fragmented, and to put it bluntly, there is little joined-up thinking in seeking a remedy. In some places the Taliban is gaining public support because it is opposing an alien force that is seen by many to be pursuing self-interest and a corrupt government.

Law enforcement is not the only way of addressing the problem of drugs, but in an unstable country it is vitally important to develop trust in a reliable and professional police service. The Afghan National Police are far from being trustworthy, and it will take many years of patient investment and training to overcome the endemic corruption that has so alienated the public. It goes without saying that the same is true of the national government which is riddled with corruption and serviced and staffed by many criminals.

The development of a police service in Afghanistan has to be slow and incremental; setbacks should be expected, and there is no guarantee that the outcome will necessarily reflect the wishes of the International community. Years of conflicting cultures and instability have to be taken into account. The Afghanistan dilemma will take many years to resolve. Although the work of developing a professional police service must be done thoroughly in order to reap long-term benefits, immediate counter-narcotics responses are needed to deal with the growing production and trafficking problems. This cannot be done by the Afghan National Police alone, and significant international policing aid is essential. International policing interventions are urgently required for bringing about quick and meaningful change; not only should this assistance be used to train the Afghan National Police, but where necessary there should be authority for the direction and control of counter-narcotics operations until such time as the local service is competent to achieve its own successes.

Members of the international community are attempting to assist the Government of Afghanistan in establishing good governance, the rule of law and a coherent drug control strategy(10). “For the Afghan State to be free of criminal influence concerted efforts must be made to improve its levels of integrity and to show that Afghan institutions can prosecute high level organized crime figures” (11). There is little evidence that such efforts are being made at present.

International assistance is frustrated by weak and corrupt central and provincial Government. Leading officials in the Government and Parliament of Afghanistan are suspected of being involved in drug trafficking and money laundering and of being supporters or members of organised criminal groups.(12) There is widespread mistrust both of and within Government, and many Government Ministries and institutions are viewed with suspicion and hostility. Law enforcement activities, the legitimate collection of revenues and the application of basic principles of justice and the rule of law are regularly frustrated by organised criminal groups operating freely within Government. These conditions make progress difficult, if not impossible. Nevertheless, the urgency of the situation requires determined efforts, and the International community should be capable of a much improved performance.

Unfortunately, there appears to be reluctance on the part of the United Nations and interested parties to commit to international policing as a significant part of the solution. The reasons given are:

1. A Standing Police Capacity Unit was recently established within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the Secretariat, based at UN HQ New York. The role of the unit is to support UN peacekeeping missions and assist in policing functions, thus preparing the way for the deployment of other police teams. However, it is acknowledged that the capacity of the unit is limited in terms of identification and quick deployment and that action may not happen in a short period of time.
2. Member States of NATO already experience great difficulty in providing adequate levels of personnel to address the security situation in Afghanistan. (13)

Notwithstanding these difficulties, almost all professionals who have any experience of the conditions prevailing in Afghanistan, especially at the border areas with Iran and Pakistan, have spoken of the need for immediate international policing assistance.

It is interesting to note that former US Ambassador James Dobbins draws attention to the failure to include international police assistance in the Afghan reconstruction effort.(14) He mentions that in the 1990s the United States deployed 1000 American, French, Canadian, Caribbean and Latin American police to augment Haiti’s military peacekeepers. In Bosnia the UN had deployed nearly 2000 international police officers to supplement 60,000 NATO soldiers. In Kosovo the ratio of international police forces was raised further, with nearly 5000 UN led international police operating alongside 50,000 NATO soldiers. He emphasises the point that by the end of the 1990s the ratio of one international police officer for every ten soldiers had become the norm for most peacekeeping missions. Dobbins asserts strongly that the introduction of police at the beginning of the mission would have gone a long way towards ensuring security; it would also have helped develop public confidence in the Afghan National Police if it were seen to be under dependable international supervision.

Without investing in human capital, adequate pay, proper training and equipment, the instillation of pride in the job, self-esteem and adequate and continuous mentoring, little progress will be made, and the world will continue to suffer the ravages of an uncontrolled drug trade. The Afghan National Police needs exposure to international policing standards before it can hope to achieve proper development. If Afghanistan is to attain security and prosperity and eventually stand on its own as a viable democratic nation, it will require a strong and honest government, a thorough understanding of its problems and the possible remedies, determined and targeted investment and a focused strategy that is adequately resourced and meticulously implemented.

In reality, the production of opium will continue well into the foreseeable future, and whilst every effort must be made to stabilise Afghanistan and establish efficient counter-narcotics policies which will include alternative livelihoods, the rest of the world must make every effort to encourage demand reduction. Afghanistan has been described as “the graveyard of Empires,” and failure to deal with the enduring problem by meaningful international co-operation in the region instead of fragmented and dissipated initiatives will cost the world dearly. The international partners must recognise that centuries of Afghan cultures and traditions cannot be exchanged overnight for western values; the transition must be in the interests of the Afghans and undertaken in a respectful manner, whilst at the same time dealing with the massive global harm of unchecked opium production.

Author Information
Ian OLIVER is a former UK police officer and is an independent consultant to UNODC; he has conducted an evaluation of law enforcement projects as part of the Thematic Country Evaluation of Afghanistan and has recently reviewed counter-narcotics training for law enforcement agencies throughout Central Asia and Afghanistan.

References
1. For information on the nature and complexity of the insurrection, reference should be made to Descent into Chaos by Ahmed Rashid, ALLEN LANE, ISBN 978-0-713-99843-6; see also Foreign Affairs Nov/Dec. 2008 “From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan” by Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid.

2. See “Cops or Robbers: The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police” by Andrew Wilder, Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit; see also Thematic Evaluation of The Technical Assistance to Afghanistan by UNODC Volume 3 Law Enforcement Programme by Ian Oliver, UNODC website - Evaluations.

3. World Drug Report 2007 (UN Publication, Sales  No E.07.XI.5)

4. UNODC, Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2007 (October 2007).

5. Thematic Evaluation of The Technical Assistance to Afghanistan by UNODC Volume 3 Law Enforcement Programme.

6. Press Release from Executive Director of UNODC available at www.unis.unvienna.org/pressrels/2006/unisnar969.html.

7. UNODC, Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2007 (Oct.2007)

8.UNODC, AfghanistanOpium Survey 2008 (Nov. 2008)

9. USA, Dept of State and Dept of Defense, Offices of Inspectors General Inter-agency Assessment of the counter narcotics Program in Afghanistan, available at http://oig.state.gov//documents/organization/90165.pdf.

10. Afghanistan Compact launched at the London Conference on Afghanistan 31st Jan-1st Feb 2006 (S/2006/90, annex); Afghanistan National Development Strategy (s/2006/105 annex); National Drug Control Strategy; and Afghanistan: Strategic Programme Framework 2006-10.

11. Mark Shaw, “Drug Trafficking and the development of organized crime in post-Taliban Afghanistan”, Afghanistan’s Drug Industry:  Structure, Functioning, Dynamics, and Implications for Counter Narcotics Policy, Doris Buddenburg and William Byrd, eds (UNODC and World Bank, 2006) available www. Web.worldbank.org. 

12. See for example, David Macdonald, Drugs in Afghanistan: Opium, Outlaws and Scorpion Tales (London Pluto Press, 2007).

13. Thematic Evaluation of the Technical Assistance Provided to Afghanistan by UNODC Volume 3 Law Enforcement Programme page 4 Para 13.

14.  “After the Taliban: Nation Building in Afghanistan”, Ambassador James F Dobbins, Potomac Books ISBN 978-1-59797-083-9 page 126.